After presenting a descriptive survey of existing fee systems, 6 this comment identifies their principal goals and examines the extent to which they achieve those goals. In conclusion, the comment suggests modifications that would increase the effectiveness of court fee systems.
I. CURRENT FEE SYsTEMs

A. Development of Multiple and Single Fee Systems
Multiple fee schedules derive from an early form of court finance in which certain officers of the court, such as bailiffs, clerks, and sheriffs, were compensated by the fees they collected from litigants for performing official duties. 7 Current multiple fee systems reflect this derivation by assessing fees primarily for services performed by officers who were formerly fee compensated, 8 while fees are generally not assessed COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, 1 PRELIMINARY REPORT 42 (1954) ; NORTH CAROLINA COURTS COMMISSION REPoRrM 5-40 (1965) . 6 Fee systems are composed of two elements: the structure of the system-what fees are assessed and who pays them-and the magnitude of fees imposed within that structure.
This comment focuses primarily on the structure of fee systems, not on the magnitude of fees.
7 Abuse of this system has led to its abolition in most areas. See H. MoRRIs, THm COUNTY FEE SYSTEM: A Na, FOR REVIsION 3 (1971) ; Moore, The Fee System of Public Administration, 9 OKLA. ST. B.J. -52 (1938) .
S The following fee schedule for the district courts of Louisiana illustrates this emphasis:
The clerks of the several district courts shall be entitled to demand and receive the following fees of office, and no more, in civil matters:
For indorsing, registering, and filing petition, twenty-five cents. For indorsing, registering, and filing supplemental or amended petition, twenty-five cents.
For indorsing, registering, and filing answer, twenty-five cents. For indorsing, registering, and filing amended answer, twenty-five cents.
For copying all instruments of writing or pleadings, not otherwise provided for, each one hundred words, including seal and certificate thereto, thirty-five cents.
For issuing citations, with seal and certificate, one dollar. For issuing copy of citation, with seal and certificate, fifty cents. For issuing writ of attachment, with seal, one dollar. For issuing copy of writ of attachment, with seal and certificate, fifty cents. For issuing writ of fieri facias, with seal, two dollars. For issuing order of seizure and sale or executory process, with seal, two dollars.
For issuing writ of sequestration, with seal, one dollar.
For issuing copy of writ of sequestration, with seal and certificate, fifty cents. For issuing venire facias in each case in which a jury may be prayed for and ordered, with seal, one dollar. For copy of venire facias, with seal and certificate, when ordered and issued, fifty cents. For swearing jury, one dollar. For swearing each witness, twenty-five cents. For entering final judgment in full on the minutes, fifty cents and thirty-five cents per hundred words.
For simply entering statement of rendition of final judgment, without copying it in the minutes, fifty cents.
For every interlocutory judgment entered on the minutes of the court no matter how many parties, fifty cents.
For each order of court entered on the minutes of courts not otherwise provided for services traditionally financed by the state, such as provision of a courtroom and a judge. In a pure multiple fee system, a litigant would be assessed a separate fee for each service provided by the court system. No existing fee system, however, uses this pure form. The cost of administering a multiple fee system 9 has prompted many states 0 to adopt single fee systems." Under a pure single fee system, one charge would cover all court services. Although many existing court fee systems approach the pure system, 12 each varies from it in some way. Almost all jurisdictions charge separate fees for service of process, 13 jury trial, 14 transcripts, 1 and preparation of the record for appeal,' 6 and several states assess a fee upon entry of judgment.' 7 Systems also vary in for, twenty-five cents.
For copies of same, with seal and certificate, fifty cents. system, the items for which fees are charged continues to expand, the amount of the fees continues to increase, and the system becomes increasingly cumbersome and confusing"). § 34.041 (1974) (on filing claim less than $100, $3.50; on filing claim greater than or equal to $100 but less than $1000, $10.00; on filing claim greater than or equal to $1000, $15.00 fee); and the size of the judgment, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56-5-3 (Supp. 1969) (when case proceeds to trial and a money judgment greater than $5000 is recovered, additional fee assessed, ranging from $10.00 for judgments over $5000 but less than $10,000, to $90.00 for judgments of at least $50,000 with an additional assessment of $2.00 for every $1000 over $50,000 that an effective fee system should be directed toward three general goals: allocation and conservation of resources, consonance with state social policies, and administrative feasibility. The effectiveness of a particular fee system can be measured by its success in achieving these goals.
Fees, like all prices, can be used to allocate and conserve resources. The basic resources used to produce court services, principally labor, could be used alternatively to produce other goods and services. In the market, consumers make their preferences known through their willing- 
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ness to pay more for particular uses of resources; producers react by allocating resources to satisfy these demands. 3 1 By establishing fees (as producers establish prices) and by reacting to consumer demand (as producers react), states can use the market mechanism to provide a proper allocation of resources to courts.
For example, private arbitration might be able to resolve a particular class of dispute at a lower-real cost than the courts. Resources would thus be misallocated if courts were used to resolve these disputes instead of arbitration. If the fee for the courts and the price of arbitration each reflect the respective costs of those services, a proper allocation of resources will occur as consumers select the less costly alternative of arbitration. 2 But if government sets the price of court services below cost, resources would be misallocated.
Fees may also help court administrators allocate resources within the court system. For example, although an administrator may believe that funds should be spent to relieve court delay, litigants may actually prefer delay. 3 3 One commentator has suggested that court fees, through the market mechanism, can be used to determine litigants' preferences by indicating whether they are willing to pay the cost of reducing delay. 4 In addition to providing a basis for allocating resources to the courts, an effective fee system can also deter waste of those resources. 3 5 Court fees, like all prices, motivate consumers to compare the benefits they 31 The scarce supply of all resources necessitates their allocation among goods and services, and that allocation is accomplished through the price component of the market mechanism. Efficient allocation occurs only in a perfectly competitive economy, where transactions are costless and firms can freely shift production from one good to another without delays. But time lags do occur in shifting production, transactions are costly, and competition is imperfect in many lines of commerce. As a result, the actual market allocation of resources is somewhat less efficient than allocations in the perfect competition model. 32 The example assumes that the two methods of dispute resolution are identical products from the consumer's viewpoint. [41:841
derive from a service with iti cost. When services are free, 36 consumers are not forced to make this comparison; they have no incentive to conserve resources, because additional consumption costs nothing. Thus, fees reflecting the real cost of providing court services would help deter waste. The second goal of an effective fee system, consonance with social policies, derives from the general proposition that all state policies and state actions should be coordinated in order to maximize citizen welfare. Court fee systems should therefore not conflict with social policies established by legislation, through court decisions, in state constitutions, or through implicit popular consensus.
Finally, an effective fee system must be administratively feasible. Fee systems generate various operating costs-for example, fees must be collected, recorded, and deposited in a bank. Although economists often simplify their analysis by ignoring operating costs, 7 a practical appraisal of fee systems requires consideration of these costs.
III. EFFECTrIVENESS OF CURRENT FEE SYSTEMS
The most effective fee system would maximize each of the three general goals. Yet these goals may often conflict, 38 and no fee system can maximize all three simultaneously. Evaluating the effectiveness of particular characteristics of fee systems thus requires not only an analysis of each characteristic's effect on each goal, but also of its effect on the interaction among goals.
A. Effectiveness of Common Characteristics of Multiple and Single
Fee Systems 1. Nominal Fees. As noted earlier, 9 fees that reflect only a small portion of actual court costs can interfere with resource allocation by making courts more attractive than alternate dispute resolution services 36 A good may be considered free not only when its initial distribution is without charge, but also when it is available in unlimited quantities at a fixed price. In the latter instance, consumption may be considered free because it costs an individual who has paid the fixed fee nothing to consume additional quantities of the good.
37 See Davies, supra note 30, at 158-60. 38 For example, the fee system that best allocates resources may have a high administrative cost, and a system that completely eliminates waste may conflict with established policy. For each conflict, competing social policies must be balanced to determine, for example, if a $500,000 annual savings in administrative cost would be worth denying relief to 500 plaintiffs per year. These conflicts must be resolved by balancing the various goals. The resolution is usually accomplished through the political process, but some conflicts can be resolved mechanically if the alternatives can be reduced to dollar cost comparisons.
39 See text and notes at notes 32 & 36 supra.
with lower real costs. Nevertheless, such distortion arising from subsidization may be justified if promoting certain social policies is considered more important than achieving appropriate allocation of resources. One-policy furthered by subsidization of litigation is society's interest in assuring the trial of a sufficient number of cases to develop and enforce rules of conduct. 4 0 Society may also consider market distribution of court services inappropriate, given the special nature of those services. Unlike most market goods or services, which are simply property, courts are a means of preserving rights in property. 41 Subsidization helps assure all citizens equal access to the courts to protect those rights. 42 A third social policy supporting subsidization is the maintenance of state control over dispute resolution. If courts are not subsidized, litigants may choose other less costly means of dispute resolution, such as arbitration or self-help. Assuming a strong social interest in confining most dispute resolution to the courts, a system of nominal fees may be effective even though the resulting inappropriate allocation of resources is costly.
Statutory Establishment of Fees and Service Levels.
Courts operate in a dynamic environment in which exogenous shocks may change the demand for litigation and the cost of providing court services. 48 Setting fees and service levels by statute interferes with resource allocation 40 [Tjhe allocative function of the legal system suggests a possible economic justification for government's defraying a portion of the costs of the system ....
If the function of the legal system were solely to settle disputes, it would be appropriate to impose the entire costs of the system on the disputants. But that is not its only function. It establishes rules of conduct designed to shape future conduct, not only the present disputants' but also other people's. Since the social benefits of a litigation may exceed the private benefits to the litigants, the amount of litigation might be too small if the litigants had to bear the total costs of the suit. R. PosNER, supra note 29, at 322-23.
Governments may thus subsidize courts, reducing fees to the level at which the amount of litigation demanded produces just enough social benefits to satisfy society's demand for these benefits. Resource allocations in this scheme could still be determined by the market; the government would effectively lower the price through subsidization and induce the market to allocate more resources to courts than it would absent subsidization. 41 Michelman, Access Fees, supra note 2. In an earlier work, Professor Michehman explored the notion that access to courts may be a "just" or "basic" want that all citizens may demand on equal grounds. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 2, at 13.
4:2 The number of citizens with access is a function of the size of the subsidy. The value of access, of course, may be undercut by long delays in processing claims that must receive prompt consideration. 48 A change in legal doctrine, such as the move toward strict products liability, can cause shifts in demand for legal services. See Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. Io. STurns 339, 346-49 (1974) . Similarly, fluctuations in the cost of inputs, such as labor, can change the cost of providing court services. by impeding adjustment to these changes. Statutes authorizing courts to establish and modify fees can alleviate this problem, because courts can adjust fees with minimal delay" and can generally behave as a private firm in setting prices 4 5 When legislatures control fee systems, the administrative cost is high; decision making requires the time of many individuals and the resources of the legislative process. Administrative decision making, by contrast, is typically less time consuming and involves fewer individuals. If there were significant advantages to legislative decision making, the additional costs of the legislative process could be justified; but legislative decision making on court fees has few advantages.
3. Prepayment Requirement. The administrative cost of requiring prepayment of court fees is considerably less than the administrative cost of deferring fee collection until the dispute is resolved. A prepayment requirement places court operations on a cash basis and does not require the states to extend interest-free credit to litigants. Moreover, since most cases are resolved before trial, 4 filing may be the only convenient time to collect the fee. Delayed collection is costly; the state must locate the parties who settle or fail to prosecute and may be forced in some cases to take legal action to collect fees or to write off a portion of fees as uncollectible. A prepayment requirement is a more efficient collection procedure.
Fee Burden on the Losing Party.
Placing the final burden of fees on the losing party may cause a misallocation and a waste of resources. In purchasing court services that may be demanded by one party without the consent of the other, a litigant will evaluate his cost not by the amount of the fee, but rather by the amount of the fee discounted by his estimate of the probability that he will win. 4 7 The 44 For examples of statutory schemes in which the authority to set fees is delegated to the courts, see note 23 supra.
45 The courts could simulate the behavior of a private firm in a competitive market by setting the price of court services equal to their marginal cost. If the courts acted as a private monopolist, however, they would maximize net revenues by setting prices above marginal costs, providing fewer services, and reaping monopoly profits. This would be an inefficient allocation of resources. See R. PosNxa, supra note 29, at 104-07. 47 For example, a litigant who believes he has a 25 percent chance of winning his case will consider a $100 jury fee to cost only $75. The litigant will calculate his cost as the amount of the fee multiplied by the probability of paying it, in this case $100 X .75. apparent cost will always be lower than the actual fee, 48 thus causing litigants to purchase more optional services than if the apparent cost were equal to the full amount of the fee. A litigant who is virtually certain of winning may request court services with impunity, since he knows he will not have to pay for them.
Conversely, assessing the losing party all fees may encourage conservation of resources. First, the rule might prompt potential losers to settle out of court, decreasing the number of trials. Second, it may foster conservation by forcing those contemplating wrongful acts to consider court fees as part of the cost of their prospective actions. 49 A rational man will commit an act only when its benefits exceed its costs. Incorporating court costs into the cost-benefit analysis may encourage a would-be wrong-doer to forego the wrongful act. 0
Provisions for Indigent Litigants.
Waiving court fees for indigents presents several problems. First, exempting indigents from payment of fees reduces their incentive to conserve resources.Y Waiver of fees allows indigents to litigate nominal or frivolous claims, 52 while others are deterred by fees from litigating similar claims. Second, administering waiver provisions is costly because it requires the use of judicial time, the scarcest resource of the legal system, to determine whether a claimant qualifies for the waiver. Waiver provisions may be justified, however, by social policies favoring equal availability of services to all citizens54 or a redistribution of wealth.
55
48 This assertion will be valid for every litigant who perceives some probability of winning his case.
49 This discussion assumes, of course; that parties contemplating wrongful acts are deterred, to some degree, by the legal system's sanctions. This may be less true for civil than for criminal acts, since an individual may be less able to predict whether his act is civilly actionable than whether it violates a criminal statute.
50 Economists have suggested that rules of tort and contract law do not prevent commission of all wrongful acts, but only those that are not cost-justified. See generally 51 See text at note 85 supra.
52 Bringing suit will cost the indigent only his time if attorney's fees and other legal services are provided without charge. Prescreening by judges and legal aid services may eliminate frivolous suits brought to harass another party, but it will not eliminateand probably is not designed to eliminate-valid suits with relatively inconsequential stakes. The usual standard is the merit of the case, not whether it economically justifies an investment of resources.
53 At least one judge has lamented the time-consuming nature of those decisions.
Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 1270 Rxv. , 1286 Rxv. (1966 .
54 See text at note 42 supra.
55 Distribution of services in kind may be a less efficient means of equalizing the distribution of wealth than comprehensive tax or grant programs. These latter programs 
B. Multiple Fee Systems
By selling each service separately, a multiple fee system provides information that permits administrators to measure litigant demand for each service and allocate resources accordingly.
56 A pure multiple fee system would be most efficient, because it provides this information for all court services. Existing multiple fee systems are less efficient, because they do so for only a limited number of services. 57 This inefficiency may be offset to some extent, however, by a social policy that certain components of court services, such as the jury 8 or the trial itself, are inappropriate for market distribution. 9
A multiple fee system effectively allocates and conserves resources only if its fees reflect actual costs. Those costs include not only the costs of the services provided, but also the administrative costs of the fee system itself. 6 0
C. Single Fee Systems
Although the pure single fee system is easy to administer and relatively inexpensive, it interferes with efficient allocation and conservation of resources because it ignores differential utilization of court servicds. A pure single fee system does ration consumption of court services; litigants are encouraged to use more services than if separate payment were required for each. 6 ' This problem has led to divergence from the pure system; many existing single fee systems isolate certain items, such as juries, and charge separately for them. Separate trial fees, however, may deter parties who have filed suit from proceeding to trial. This deterrent effect would conflict with the state's need for trials to establish rules of conduct and with its interest in monopolizing dispute resolution.
D. The Optimal Fee System
As noted earlier 6 3 conflicts exist among the general goals, and no fee system can accomplish all three goals simultaneously. An optimal system could nonetheless be defined if a common unit of measure could be applied to each goal; the optimum would then be attained by maximizing the single summed value of all the goals. Unfortunately, no common measure can be applied to these goals, because each goal has two effects, only one of which can be objectively measured. The first effect is on real costs, which are lowered, for example, when a system of greater administrative feasibility or more efficient resource allocation is instituted. The second effect is on social costs, which are lower, for example, in a system that furthers a social policy of redistributing wealth. The first effect is tangible and can be objectively evaluated, but the second effect is intangible and amenable to only subjective evaluation. Thus, although it is impracticable to define an optimal system with respect to total costs, both real and social, it would be possible to define an optimal system with respect to real costs alone. This optimum would exist when real costs are minimized.
Implementing this theoretical concept is not easy; it is unlikely that an optimal system could actually be devisedand put into use. The preceding analysis of multiple and single fee systems, however, suggests one means of minimizing real costs. As that analysis indicated, single fee systems tend to sacrifice conservation and allocation benefits to attain savings in administrative cost, while multiple fee systems tend to sacrifice administrative cost savings to attain conservation and allocation benefits. By breaking apart some of the services sold as a unit under the single fee system, and by grouping and selling as a single unit some of the services sold separately in the multiple fee system, it may be possible to develop a new system that operates at a lower net real cost than either existing system. The problem is one of creating bundles of services that are highly associated, in that litigants who purchase one service are likely to purchase all other services within the group as well.
Ascertaining the degree of association among various court services is difficult, but one modification in court fee systems is suggested by o Seetextand note at note 88 supra. a basic pattern of association among court services. First, all litigants utilize pretrial services, such as those related to filing and docketing an action. An individual who purchases one pretrial service is likely to purchase all such services. But a relatively small number of litigants reach trial, and there is wide variation in their use of trial-related services. 5 A fee system could become more effective by utilizing two fees based on these patterns of association.
6
The first fee would be an entry fee, similar to a filing fee, and would cover all pretrial services. Since the additional nontrial services available to a litigant after filing are relatively few and relatively inexpensive, use of a single fee reflecting the average costs of pretrial processing would not significantly encourage waste or misallocation of resources.
The second fee would apply only to litigants who proceed to trial. Unlike the entry fee, which would be the same for all cases, the trial fee would vary with the length of the trial and the use of a jury. A fixed rate for each day or half day of trial, supplemented by a surcharge for use of a jury, would probably be most efficient. Although this system would be more costly to administer than one utilizing a single fixed trial fee, the additional cost would be justified, because the system would conserve court resources by discouraging unnecessarily lengthy trials. 7 CONCLUSION An analysis of court fee systems and their three general goals-allocation and conservation of resources, consonance with social policies, and administrative feasibility-suggests that an effective fee system would group all court services into two bundles. Services from the time of filing until trial would be purchased with a single fee common to all cases; a second fee would cover trial services, varying with the length of trial and the use of a jury. This system combines the resource allocation and conservation characteristics of a multiple fee system with the administrative efficiency of a single fee system.
The high cost of deferred collection of the fee for pretrial services justifies a prepayment requirement. If the plaintiff prevails, however, 05 1972 RXPORT, supra note 46, at 159. This is indicated by the duration of the 18,700 civil actions tried in United States district courts during fiscal 1972: 27.7 percent of the actions were tried in less than one day; 25.8 percent lasted one day; 22.4 percent lasted two days; 10.5 percent lasted three days; 12.1 percent lasted between four and nine days; and 1.5 percent lasted ten days or more.
66 At least one jurisdiction has incorporated this pattern into its fee system. See note 19 supra. 67 Litigation costs other than court fees will be considerable in most cases, and thus will also deter the unwarranted use of additional trial resources. the judgment should include prepaid fees. Assessment of the trial charge must necessarily await the end of the trial, when it would be collected from the losing party. Placing the fee burden on the losing party is justified on efficiency and policy grounds.
